Double Fire Tragedy of Kenya by Young, Lester et al.
Double Fire Tragedy of Kenya
Lester Young, MD, Rowena Orosco, RN, Stephen Milner, BDS, FRCS, FACS
Johns Hopkins Burn Center, Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Baltimore, Maryland
Correspondence: smilner3@jhmi.edu
Published December 16, 2009
Objective:Withindaysofeachother,2catastrophicﬁresoccurredinKenya.OnJanuary
28, 2009, a busy supermarket was destroyed in downtown Nairobi. Shortly thereafter on
February 2, an overturned petrol tanker exploded near the village of Molo, 200 km from
the capital. These 2 disasters, in an urban and a rural setting, respectively, illustrate the
lack of disaster readiness on a local and national level. Methods: A call for assistance
was responded to by the James Jordan Foundation, which sponsored a team from the
United States to provide consultation and patient care. Subsequent to this team’s ex-
periences, a review of medical records at the Kenyatta National Hospital, interactions
with government health ofﬁcials, and investigation of public media resources, the fol-
lowing observations are reported. Results: Twenty-six victims died in the supermarket
ﬁre, and 20 who were admitted to local hospitals later succumbed. At Molo, 91 lives
were claimed at the scene; 178 patients were admitted to various hospitals, 40 of whom
died. Conclusion: The ﬁres brought to light factors contributing to these events and
their outcomes. In addition, it produced improvised solutions for resuscitation of mass
casualties and the performance of emergency surgery with inadequate equipment and
facilities.
Catastrophic ﬁres have occurred in virtually every major city in the world. In the last
century, there have been 73 such disasters in the United States alone. Experiences with
these events have led to institution of ﬁre regulations, creation of medical disaster response
plans, and reshaping of governmental legislation.1−3 Nevertheless, burn disasters continue
to pose logistical challenges in triage, management, and allocation of resources. When
such ﬁres occur in locations with limited resources, the challenges faced are signiﬁcantly
ampliﬁed. This was demonstrated in 2 tragic ﬁres that occurred recently in Kenya.
Kenya is located on the eastern coast of Africa overlooking the Indian Ocean, with
a population of more than 5 million. Its capital city, Nairobi, has a population of some 3
million. Occupying the Central Business District of Nairobi is a dense conglomerate of
businesses and shopping centers (Fig 1).
NAKUMATT DOWNTOWN SUPERMARKET FIRE
The following is a compilation of eye-witness accounts of the Nakumatt Downtown Super-
market Fire (January 28, 2009; with permission of Nation Media Group).
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Figure 1. Crowded street trafﬁc in downtown Nairobi.
During a normally busy afternoon in the Central Business District, trafﬁc crawls through streets
congested with pedestrians. Customers and employees in the crowded Nakumatt Supermarket go
about their business. A power transformer blows and the lights cut out momentarily, causing some
bewilderment. Moments later, the backup generator can be heard as it is activated, rekindling the
lights. As the people regain their bearings, the lights go out again, followed by a plume of thick
smoke that is shrouded by darkness, but chokes all that were within its reach. What was generalized
confusion instantly turns into widespread panic. The ﬁre alarm sounds amid the screams. A few
employees struggle with a ﬁre hose as the ﬂames spread from beneath the staircase, where the
generator is housed on the ground ﬂoor. Then there is a series of explosions as the fuel tanks stored
next to the generator detonate.
VIDEO 1
Video 1. Kenya Nakumatt Fire Movie
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Figure 2. Customers and employees ﬂeeing from
Nakumatt Supermarket.
Figure 3. Fire brigade arriving, battling the Nakumatt Supermarket
ﬁre.
The Supermarket was located in Nairobi’s Central Business District on Kenyatta Av-
enue. A historic building, it stood 3 ﬂoors high. The entire store burned to the ground
together with the neighboring Alibhai Shariff Building. The ﬁre started around 3:45 PM,
on January 28, 2009, with workers and customers ﬂeeing from the ﬂames and smoke.
As the ﬁre spread to the neighboring buildings, gas tanks and containers ﬁlled with
ﬂammable chemicals in a hardware store ignited and fueled the already-uncontrollable
blaze. Since the ﬁre started on the ground ﬂoor beneath a stairway, dozens of people be-
cametrappedaboveandmanysustainedseriousinjurieswhenforcedtojumpfromtheupper
levels.
It took over an hour for ﬁreﬁghters to reach the blaze. The Nairobi City Council
Fire Brigade, Kenya Police, Kenya Airports Authority Fire Fighters, G4S Fire Brigade,
Kenya Airforce, Securex Fire, and Kenya Red Cross all eventually responded. Casual-
ties were taken to Kenyatta National Hospital and surrounding Nairobi City Hospitals
(Figs 2 and 3).
The ﬁre was extinguished with difﬁculty, owing to the abundance of inﬂammable
materials within the buildings and continued to burn for almost 3 days. Not until the arrival
of the Kenyan Air Force ﬁreﬁghters with powdered carbon dioxide ﬁre extinguishers would
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the ﬁre ultimately be controlled. In the aftermath, 26 bodies were recovered from the ruins,
most of them unrecognizable. Many critically ill patients would later succumb to their
injuries, bringing the death toll to 46 (Fig 4).
Figure 4. Search for victims of the Nakumatt Supermarket ﬁre.
MOLO TANKER FIRE
A few days later, near the small town Sachang’wan, in the Molo District of the Rift
Valley Province, a second tragedy unfolded. Around 7:30 PM, a tanker truck ﬁlled with
approximately 42,000 L of petrol traveling from Mombasa overturned on the side of the
Nakuru-Eldorat highway. The following is also a compilation of eye-witness accounts from
survivors and observers of the events that occurred on February 2, 2009 (with permission
of Nation Media Group).
As fuel spills onto the ground, word of the accident spreads and hundreds of nearby inhabitants
rush to the scene. Drivers and motorcyclists call one another, and workers on nearby farms, villages,
and shopping centers scurry to the site, as do dozens of children who are off school because of the
weekend. With various containers and makeshift siphons in hand, there are frantic efforts to collect
the spilt fuel. Some women with small children strapped to their backs are among those gathered. The
crowd continued to enlarge as some proceed to drill holes into the tanker to expedite the collection
process. Some even start charging a fee to collect the petrol. Soon thereafter, the local police and
paramilitary General Service Unit arrive in attempts to control the unsettled crowd. As the people
continued to scufﬂe for the spilling petrol, a cigarette was believed to have triggered the ﬁre and
subsequent explosion.
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VIDEO 2
Video 2. K e n y aM o l oF i r eM o v i e
Hundreds of people hovered around the tanker and standing in surrounding petrol-
ﬁlled trenches were incinerated immediately. Hundreds more standing within 50 m of the
truck also fell victim to the blast. The explosion set the surrounding forest ablaze, as well as
several cars and motorcycles. Some of the burned victims tried to make their way through
thewoodedareatothenearbyMoloRiver.Eightbodieswerefoundatanearbycattletrough
as they attempted to douse the ﬂames that consumed them.
An estimated 91 victims were killed at the scene; many of them were women and
children. Another 178 people sustained severe thermal injuries. Molo did not have its own
ﬁre engine. The Nakuru Municipal Council’s ﬁreﬁghters did not arrive until an hour after
the initial explosion. Rescuers who arrived at the scene were kept at bay by the intense heat,
neither able to ﬁght the ﬁre nor able to help the injured victims. Most of the bodies were
burnt beyond recognition (Figs 5 and 6).
A few ambulances and several onlookers loaded burnt survivors into their vehicles
and transported them to the nearby Rift Valley Provincial General Hospital and Molo
District Hospital. Ambulances were also dispatched from Nairobi, Kenyatta, and Aga Khan
Hospitals from Nairobi, which were several hours away. The survivors were distributed
to neighboring hospitals (Table 1). Unfortunately, these hospitals were still in the mid of
dealing with the Nakumatt Supermarket ﬁre tragedy. Eventually the death toll rose to 131
as more patients eventually succumbed to their injuries.
The Kenyan Army, Airforce, and Red Cross coordinated by the Ministry of Public
Health and Medical Services collaborated to collect and deliver medical supplies and
donated blood. They also facilitated the transfer of patients between the hospitals by
helicopter. Teams of military healthcare workers were dispatched to the local hospitals to
assist in treatment as well. The Kenyan government and Ministry of Public Health also put
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out a worldwide plea for aid, which was answered by The James Jordan Foundation. An
additional group was also deployed from India.
Figure 5. Victims of the Molo
tanker ﬁre.
Figure 6. Resuscitation at the scene of the
Molo tanker ﬁre.
Table 1. Distribution of casualties from the
Molo Tanker Fire
Hospital No. of victims
Molo District Hospital 112
Nakuru Provincial General Hospital 67
Kenyatta National Hospital 46
Kenyatta Hospital 28
Mater M. Hospital 12
Nairobi 3
Aga Khan 3
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EXPERIENCE OF THE SURGICAL TEAM AT KENYATTA NATIONAL
HOSPITAL
Kenyatta National Hospital in Nairobi is considered the largest and most advanced hos-
pital in Kenya. Their burn unit consisted of approximately 8 rooms and a dedicated
operating room. Our team arrived 10 days after the ﬁres and the wards were full, mostly of
children and adolescents. It was a credit to the hospital that so many had survived; however,
most of the patients with larger burns had extensive infected eschars (Fig 7).
Figure 7. An 8 year-old female with infected
burns to her trunk and right upper extremity.
Emergency fascial excisions were performed as a matter of urgency, to remove as
much necrotic tissue as possible and limit the sepsis. By modern standards, the conditions
were meager. The medical supplies were extremely limited. Items that would routinely be
thrown away in modern hospitals were recycled indeﬁnitely. The sterile technique observed
in contemporary operating rooms was difﬁcult to perform. Essential equipment such as
tourniquets, electrocautery, and powered instruments such as dermatomes were absent.
Improvisations included the use of rubber gloves as tourniquets; excisions were carried out
by sharp dissection and skin graft harvested with a Humby knife (Fig 8).
Figure 8. Fascial excision of leg performed with
scalpel. A rubber glove is tied around the thigh as
a tourniquet.
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VIDEO 3
Video 3. Kenya Arm Excision Movie
VIDEO 4
Video 4. Kenya Leg Excision Movie
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DISCUSSION
In the days following the tragic events, the public and media would express concern
regarding the lack of ﬁre preparedness and disaster response displayed by the city and
government for both incidents. Molo, a town with a population of approximately 90,000,
completely lacked a ﬁre brigade, the nearest being an hour away in the neighboring town
of Nakuru. The situation regarding the Nakumatt Supermarket was also scrutinized. In
the capital city of Nairobi, with a population of more than 3,000,000, there was only 1
fully equipped ﬁre brigade. Although the ﬁre station was within the downtown area, it
took over an hour for the arrival of ﬁreﬁghters due to poorly controlled trafﬁc and a lack
of a response plan. Survivors and witnesses of the supermarket ﬁre suspected that the
supermarket employees and security guards may have locked the doors to prevent looting,
thus trapping customers in the building and preventing their escape. This was corroborated
by the difﬁculties the ﬁreﬁghters encountered when trying to enter the building through
these locked doors. Furthermore, the bodies that were recovered were hovered around the
doors that normally served as exits. The hospitals were certainly overwhelmed by the sheer
volume of casualties as well as the inability to access proper resources.
Deadly tanker ﬁres are common in Africa. Recently, there have been similar incidents
throughout Africa, causing hundreds of deaths. In March 2007, 98 people died from a
tanker explosion in Nigeria.4 Similarly, in August 2008, more than 30 people died in
a tanker explosion in Cameroon.5 In November 2008, more than 20 people died in yet
another incident in Ghana.6 Barely 2 days after the Molo tanker ﬁre, a derailed cargo
train transporting detergent chemicals was emptied by nearby Kenyan residents of Nivasha.
In another incident, merely 32 km from the site of the tanker ﬁre, truck carrying maize
collided with another vehicle. Again, people rushed to the scene to empty the fuel tanks of
the vehicles.
There are several factors that may have contributed to the dire circumstances that
surrounded these 2 incidents and their outcomes. As has been repeatedly proven, these
looting practices create fatal situations. Many blame the overall state of poverty in Kenya
as the driving force toward these desperate and dangerous acts of stealing fuel. However,
it is believed to be much more complicated than that. Siphoning fuel from tankers along
Kenyan highways has become relatively commonplace.7 Transporters are estimated to lose
millions of shillings in this racket yearly. These activities are especially common along
steep sections of Kenyan highways where large trucks carrying goods are forced to travel
at slow speeds and stop frequently. The hazardous roads make the trucks prone to ﬂipping,
by accident or even deliberately. There is believed to be a whole network of cartels that
collaborate with truck and train crews, to orchestrate these thefts.
Therewascertainlyadeﬁcitofﬁreﬁghtingpersonnelandequipment.TheMoloDistrict
completely lacked a ﬁre brigade. In the highly populous urban Nairobi, there is a single
ﬁre brigade that serves 3,000,000 people. Even when within several hundred meters of
the Nakumatt Supermarket, the response time was greater than an hour. Furthermore, the
manner in which the ﬁre was fought was inappropriate due in part to lack of knowledge
and ﬁreﬁghting resources. Although the claims of the exits being locked had not been
conﬁrmed, certainly keeping exits free of obstruction would facilitate escape.
Itisextremelydifﬁculttocriticizethehospitalsthatareinvolvedinthesemasscasualty
situations. Even in the most industrially advanced countries with cutting-edge technologies
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and well-equipped medical centers, tragedies such as these would certainly exceed their
resources as well.
An interesting observation, evident on documentation, was the manner in which many
of these patients were resuscitated. Casualties were given plain drinking water for acute re-
suscitation.Paucityofequipmentandstaffpreventedadministrationofﬂuidsintravenously,
as well as appropriate medication, or monitoring. Assuming that the patients are triaged
appropriately and limited resources allocated accordingly, the easiest, fastest, and most
cost-effective way of resuscitating burned patients may well be via oral resuscitation. This
can also be used to supplement intravenous measures.8
Medical records of patients admitted to Kenyatta National Hospital were reviewed.
All of them received a signiﬁcant amount of water during the acute/resuscitative phase
as well as the hypermetabolic phase. It was noted that all of the patients became
hyponatremic, with serum sodium levels ranging from 123 to 130 mEq/L. The compli-
cations from hyponatremia, such as water toxicity and cerebral edema, were not evident.
Through tragic events such as these 2 catastrophic ﬁres, many issues come to the
forefront; questions are raised, regulations are evaluated, and criticisms are voiced. The
perceived lack of disaster readiness in the medical and nonmedical emergency services
has certainly come under scrutiny in the Kenyan public and media. Since these incidents,
effortsledbytheMinistryofPublicHealthandMedicalServicesarebeingmadetoenhance
disaster preparedness and response. Sadly, many economic and social issues may continue
to create these hazardous situations, ultimately undermining the promotion of disaster
preparedness and response.
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